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From the Bankruptcy Courts
Alan N. Resnick* and Brad Eric Scheler**

Limitations on the United States
Trustee's Power to Appoint
Committees: Lessons from
PG&E

Representative committees play
an important role in large and complex chapter 11 cases. 1 Under section 1102 of the Bankruptcy Code,
the United States trustee is required
to appoint a committee of creditors
holding unsecured claims against the
debtor, and also has the discretion
to appoint additional committees of
creditors or equity security holders
"as the United States trustee deems
appropriate." 2 Thus, in the first instance, the U.S. trustee determines
the number of committees in the case
and selects the membership of each.

* Benjamin Weintraub Distinguished
Professor of Bankruptcy Law, Hofstra University School of Law, Hempstead, NY; Of
Counsel to the firm of Fried, Frank, Harris,
Shriver & Jacobson, New York, NY.
** Chairman of the Bankruptcy and
Restructuring Department of the firm of
Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson,
New York, NY.
The authors thank Jennifer Rodburg for
her valuable assistance in the preparation of
this article.
1 See 11 USC § 1103 on the powers and
duties of committees in chapter 11 cases.
2 II USC § 11 02(a)(l ). However, the
court may order that a creditors' committee
not be appointed if the debtor is a small business. II USC§ 1102(a)(3). See I I USC§
I0 I for the definition of "small business."

On request of a party in interest, the
court has the power to order the appointment of additional committees
of creditors or equity security holders. However, upon entry of such an
order, the Code gives the U.S.
trustee, rather than the court, the
exclusive task of selecting and appointing the committee members.3
A controversial issue that has been
raised in a number of cases is
whether, or to what extent, a bankruptcy court may review a decision
of the U.S. trustee with respect to the
appointment of committees. This
question has been examined recently
in a decision of the Bankruptcy
Court for the Northern District of
California in In re Pacific Gas &
Electric Company. 4
The Facts

On April 6, 200 I, Pacific Gas &
Electric Company (PG&E) filed a
3 See II USC § 1102(a)(2), which gives
the court the authority' on request of a party
in interest, to appoint additional committees
of creditors or equity security holders if necessary to assure adequate representation, but
states that the United States trustee shall
appoint any such committee.
4
Bankruptcy Case No. OI-30923DM,
Memorandum Decision Regarding Motion
for Order Vacating Appointment of Committee of Ratepayers, May 18, 2001 ("PG&E
memorandum decision'').
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petition for relief under chapter 11
of the Bankruptcy Code in the Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of California. PG&E is an
electric and gas utility company that
provides services to northern and
central California. It is one 'of the
largest companies to file for bankruptcy in U.S. history. The chapter
11 case of PG&E, including orders
affecting utility rates entered during
the case and the provisions of a reorganization plan, could have a significant impact on the customers
who pay for utility services in California. In order to protect the interests of PG&E customers, as a group,
the U.S. trustee appointed an Official Committee of Ratepayers to act
as a representative body with a voice
to participate in the chapter 11 case.
The U.S. trustee also appointed the
Official Committee of Unsecured
Creditors.Shortly after the U.S. trustee appointed the Ratepayers Committee,
PG&E filed a motion for an order
vacating the appointment. The U.S.
trustee and certain ratepayers submitted opposition papers arguing
that the court did not have the authority to review the U.S. trustee's
discretionary appoihtment of the
Ratepayers Committee under section
1102(a) of the Bankruptcy Code.
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trustee has been complicated by the
language, the legislative history, and
the 1986 amendment of section 1102
of the Bankruptcy Code, which governs the appointment of committees.
Section 1102(a) provides as follows:
(l) Except as provided in paragraph (3), as soon as practicable after the order for relief
under chapter 11 of this title,
the United States trustee shall
appoint a committee of creditors holding unsecured claims
and may appoint additional
committees of creditors or of
equity security holders as the
United States trustee deems
appropriate.
(2) On request of a party in interest, the court may order the
appointment of additional
committees of creditors or of
equity security holders if necessary to assure adequate representation of creditors or of
equity security holders. The
United States trustee shall appoint any such committee.
(3) On request of a party in interest in a case in which the
debtor is a small business and
for cause, the court may order that a committee of creditors not be appointed.

Before.1986, when Congress enacted legislation to make the U.S.
trustee program nationwide;~ section
1102(c) provided:

The Court's Rol~ in Reviewing
Appointments by the UnHed

States Trustee
The issue of whether a court is
empowered to review 1the appointment of committees by the U.S.

'Since 1986, every region has a United
States trustee, except for the districts located
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On request of a party in interest and
after notice and a hearing, the court
may change the membership or the
size of a committee appointed under
subsection (a) of this section if the
membership of such committee is not
representative of the different kinds
of claims or interests to be represented.6

The 1986 amendments to the
Bankruptcy Code deleted this section in its entirety, which raises the
question of the court's proper role,
if any, in reviewing committee appointments made by-the U.S. trustee.
In PG&E, the U.S. trustee relied
on In re Wheeler Techndlogy, Inc. 7
when arguing in favor of the proposition that courts lack jurisdiction to
review her discretionary appointment of the Ratepayers Committees
under section 11 02(a). In deciding
whether the district court had the
power to remove a creditor from a
committee as a sanction for violating the automatic stay, the appellate
panel in Wheeler Technology found
that, by deleting section 1102(c),
Congress explicitly took away from
the courts the power to delete a
member from a committee appointed by a U.S. trustee. The appellate panel also reasoned that
section I 05(a}-which grants the
court the power "to issue any order,
process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the
provisions of [the Bankruptcy Code]
in North Carolina and Alabama, where administrative tasks are performed by bankruptcy administrators.
6 I J USC§ I l02(c).
7 J39 B.R. 235 (9th Cir. BAP 1992).

... or to prevent an abuse of process"8 -can not be used to circumvent the clear intent of Congress to
exclusively place the committee-appointing power with the U.S. trustee.
In response, PG&E relied on In re
Pierce9 for the proposition that section 105(a) allows courts to review
the U.S. trustee's appointment under an abuse of discretion standard.
According to Pierce, such a review
may be justified under section 105(a)
because it may be necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions
of the Bankruptcy Code or to prevent an abuse of process. In essence,
the provisions of chapter I 1 cannot
be carried out if the U.S. trustee
abuses the discretion afforded her
under that chapter.
The bankruptcy court found that
neither Wheeler Technology nor
Pierce applied directly to PG&E because they did not involve a request
to disband a committee in its entirety
as not being authorized by law. Hl
s II USC §105(a).
9 237 B.R. 748 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1999).
10
The Court noted that there was one
case, In reNew Life Fellowship, Inc., 202
B.R. 994 (Bankr. W.D. Okla.) which addressed the court's authority to review the
U.S. trustee's appointment of a committee
in the context of a request tO' disband the
committee. In New life Fellowship, the court
held that it lacked authority to review the
decision of the U.S. trustee to appoint a
bondholders' committee because the Bankruptcy Code is absolute on its terms that the
U.S. trustee shall appoint committees. The
court in PG&Erefused to follow New Life
Fellowship because the reasoning of Pierce
and the majority of other cases was more
persuasive. Also, the PG&E court noted that
that case involved the appointment of a committee specifically authorized by law as op-
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However, the court agreed with the
Pierce analysis, which represents the
majority view, in finding that it had
the power under section 1OS(a) to
review the U.S. trustee's appointment of the Ratepayers Committee
under an abuse of discretion standard. In Pierce, the court noted that
the U.S. trustee performed administrative functions and was not aju"dicial officer, thereby rendering it
inappropriate for the U.S. trustee to
resolve disputes regarding the propriety of her own actions. ·Thus, by
deleting section 11 02(c), Congress
could not have intended to give the
U.S. trustee unfettered and unreviewable discretion in appointing
committee members. The appointments by the U.S. trustee must logically be reviewable in some manner
by some forum. The court in PG&E,
relying on several other cases as
well, stated that bankruptcy courts
must have the inherent power to review acts of the U.S. trustee, or
"there would be no means for judicial review of the UST' s actions,
even if the UST exceeded her authority and acted contrary to law. " 11
The Standard of Review

Upon its finding that it had the
authority to review the U.S. trustee's
appointment of the Ratepayers Com.mittee under section 105(a), the
bankruptcy court then focused on the
appropriate standard of review. The
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court, consistent with prevailing authority regarding judicial review of
a U.S. trustee's acts, held that the
standard is the "arbitrary and capricious" or "abuse of discretion" standard, rather than a de novo reView
standard. The court observed that
these prevailing standards have been
drawn from appellate practice.
Though it does not sit as an appellate court reviewing a judicial decision, the standard of review is the
same. "Applying these appellate
standards, this court cannot simply
substitute its judgment for that of the
UST, but it can overturn a UST's
decision that is based on an erroneous interpretation of law.'' 12 Therefore, the court had to decide whether
the U.S. trustee, in exercising her
discretion, disregarded controlling
law.
United States Trustee's Lack of
Authority to Appoint Ratepayers
Committee

Upon its review of the provisions
of the Bankruptcy Code that grant
the U.S. trustee the p6w~f to appoint
committees, the Court found that the
U.S. trustee lacked authority. to create the Ratepayers Committee and,
therefore, such appointment was an
abuse of discretion. Several reasons
were mentioned for this conclusion.
First, as the bankruptcy court explained, section 11 02(a)( 1) authorized the U.S. trustee to appoint a
committee of creditors holding unsecured claims. It also authorizes the

posed to the Ratepayers Committee in
PG&E.
11

12

PG&E memorandum decision at 3.
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U.S. trustee to appoint, in her discretion, additional committees of
creditors. Section 1102(a)(2) authorizes the appointment of additional
committees upon the request of a
party in interest if the appointment
of such additional committees is necessary to assure adequate representation of creditors. Similarly,
sections 1102(b) directs that a committee of creditors appointed under
section 11 02(a) shall ordinarily consist of the holders of the seven largest
claims against the debtor of the kinds
represented on such committee. 13
The court further explained that
section 101(10) defines "creditor" as
an entity that has a" ... claim against
the debtor that arose at the time of
or before the order for relief." 14 The
court noted that Congress intended
that creditor committees in chapter
1 1 cases could consist only of holders of prepetition claims, rather than
postpetition claims. Applying this rationale, the PG&E court analyzed
the interests of the ratepayers represented by the Ratepayers Committee in order to determine if they were
prepetition "creditors." If so, the
appointment of a committee representing their interests would have
been authorized under section
11 02(a) of the Bankruptcy Cod~.
The court found no articulation of
a particular claim of any ratepayer
qua ratepayer that existed on the
13 Section II 02(a) also authorizes the
appointment of a committee of equity security holders. In addition, section 1114 authorizes the appointment of commiuees of
retirees in appropriate cases.
14

petition date that could justify the
creation of the Ratepayers Committee as a committee of "creditors."
Specifically, the court found that although blackouts may have caused
damages to certain ratepayers before
the filing of PG&E's bankruptcy
petition, claims arising therefrom
would be the same for nonratepayers. Accordingly, both
ratepayers and non-ratepayers would
be protected by the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors as
prepetition holders of unsecured
claims. Moreover, unchallenged authority was presented by PG&E's
general counsel that PG&E, as a
regulated utility, would be insulated
from liability based on problems
encountered by ratepayers as a result of rolling blackouts. The court
could not find any events that occurred before bankruptcy that would
give any ratepayer a "right to payment" pursuant to section 10 I (5), or
establish that PG&E owed a "debt"
to any ratepayer such that ratepayers,
as a group, could be considered
creditors for the purpose of creating
a separate committee to represent
their interests.
The court also pointed out that any
recoveries coming from the use of
the avoiding powers of the Bankruptcy Code as applied to PG&E's
affiliates will "redound to the benefit of the estate generally, and not
to a separate class of ratepayers." 15
In addition, any proceedings resulting in benefits ordered by regulatory
1

See 11 USC§ 101(10).
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agencies such as the California Public Utilities Commission ("CPUC")
would take place before such agencies with the right to be heard governed by nonbankruptcy law, and
any refunds ordered by the CPUC
would tak~ the form of future rate
adjustments.
Ratepayers Have Other Options

The court emphasized that depriving ratepayers of an official committee to represent their interests does
not mean that they are without other
avenues for effective representation.
In fact, the court found that the creation of a Ratepayers Committee
was not necessary to protect their
interests. First, the court recognized
that the Attorney General of the State
of California has access to the bankruptcy court under Rule 2018(b) of
the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy
Procedure, which provides that "the
Attorney General of a State may
appear and be heard on behalf of
consumer creditors if the court determines the appearance is in the
public interest.... " 16
16 The court noted, however, that the
Attorney General of the State of California
has decided not to accept the invitation to
appear, "apparently fearing that sovereign
immunity protection will be lost if the State
of California takes advantage of this right.
The court expresses no opinion on whether
that will occur or whether it makes sense
for the Attorney General to explore the possibility of a stipulation that would preserve
the sovereign immunity defense for other
matters." PG&E memorandum decision at
8. In that regard, the court mentioned that
PG&E and the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors have already agreed on
record to that possibility. They also agreed
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Second, the ratepayers, or an individual ratepayer, 1may be able to
appear before the court under section 1109(b), which gives a party in
interest the right to appear and be
heard on any issue in the case. The
court noted that "party in interest"
is not defined in the Bankruptcy
Code, but it appears some 46 times
within the Bankruptcy Code and
Bankruptcy Rules. "Congress certainly knew the difference ~etween
'parties in interest' and 'creditors' ·
when it empowered the latter to organize as a committee and participate in bankruptcy cases at the
expense of the estate. It did not extend that right to parties in interest."17 The court stressed that when
a particular ratepayer wished to be
heard on any matter, the court will
decide at that time whether, and to
what extent, that ratepayer may be
considered a party in interest and be
heard. In addition, the court was
careful to note that nothing in the z/
court's order was intended to affect
the rights of ratepayers to be heard
in a forum other than the bankruptcy
court, and that if the bankruptcy
court' is ever required to exercise
that t~ey are willing to stipulate that the Attorney General can represent all r~Jiepayers,
notwithstanding Rule,2018's possible limitation that the Attorney General can represent only "consumer creditors." PG&E
memorandum decision at n.6. Finally, the
court commented that "[i)f the ratepayers of
PG&E believe they are entitled to the assistance of the Attorney General they should
resort to the political arena to seek relief.
The court cannot..help them because Congress has not provided a means for it to do
so." PG&E memorandum decision at n.6.
17 PG&E memorandum decision at 8.

220

FROM THE BANKRUPTCY COURTS

power traditionally vested in a regulatory agency, then the appropriateness of a committee consisting of
ratepayers may be revisited.
Finally, the court agreed with the
U.S. trustee's assertion that
ratepayers are greatly interested in
the outcome of the case and the financial affairs of PG&E, but emphasized that having such an interest in
the results of the case does not rise
to the level of having a claim as defined in the Bankruptcy Code that
could warrant the creation of their
own committee. 18
Section 105(a) Cannot Save the
Ratepayers Committee

The court then focused on the use,
or misuse, of section 1OS( a) in the
context of the Ratepayers Committee. First, it acknowledged that one
might "reasonably argue" that, since
the court is using section I OS(a)
powers to review the U.S. trustee's
appointment of the Ratepayers Committee, it would be consistent to use
the same section to serve the public
interest by creating such a committee, notwithstanding the limitations
in section 11 02(a) regarding com-

IK ThePG&E court

cited the court in the

Public Service of New Hampshire case. "Although clearly interested in the outcome of
the Utility's organization [sic] proceedings,
ratepayers arguably lack a strong enough
investment in a utility to warrant an independent and unfettered voice in the reorganization." In rePublic Service Co. of New
Hampshire, 88 B.R. 546. 553, quoting
Flaschen & Reilly, Bankruptcy Analysis of
a Financially-Troubled Utility, 22 Hous.
L.REV. 965,971-73 (1985).

mittee appointments. But the court
found no inconsistency in its decision. The court explained that the
Bankruptcy Code is silent as to
whether courts can review the U.S.
trustee's decisions and actions and,
therefore, using section 105(a) as a
basis for such judicial review does
not conflict with any provision of the
Bankruptcy Code. However, section
ll02(a) preempts the subject of
committee creation in that it describes only two categories of entities that may be organized as official
committees, creditors and equity security holders. Relying on section
lOS( a) to allow the Ratepayers Committee to continue as an official committee, despite the fact that it does
not consist of creditors or equity security holders, would cause the court
to "override the clear limitations of
the statute," which "would itself be
an abuse of discretion." 19
Motion for Reconsideration

The bankruptcy court denied motions for reconsideration filed by the
U.S. trustee and the former Ratepayers' Committee. 20 Again, the
court emphasized that the fundamental question is "whether a ratepayer
is a creditor solely because that person is a ratepayer, as distinguished
from the fact that any particular ratepayer might be a creditor holding a
claim as defined in Bankruptcy Code
9
l
20

PG&E memorandum decision at 10.

In re Pacific Gas & Electric Co., Case

No. 01-30923-DM, Transcript of Proceedings, July I 0, 200 I (hereinafter referred to
as "Transcript").

221

UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE LAW JOUNAL

Section 10 l (5)." 21 Employing the
"fair contemplation test" adopted by
the Ninth Circuit, 22 the court held
that ratepayers do not have claimsas ratepayers-because they do not
have a right to damages based on the
debtor's prepetition conduct coupled
with a fair contemplation of the existence of a claim caused by that
conduct. In particular, the mere possibility that the California Public
Utilities Commission may someday
order refunds to ratepayers does not
risetothelevelofa'~ontingent

claim" under the Code. There were
no pending refund orders of the
Commission and, in any event, any
adjustments to rates based on
prepetition conduct could be made
by the Commission in the form of
prospective rate adjustments, rather
than refunds to ratepayers. "In summary, there is no theory on which the
Court can conclude that a future rate
adjustment applicable to then-existing ratepayers translates to a claim
as of the petition date for bankruptcy
purposes." 23
The bankruptcy court also rejected
the argument made in the motions
for reconsideration that rat~ayers
have claims for interruption in service based on intercompany transfers. "Not only are there no facts to
support any of these theories, there
is nothing to suggest that as of the
petition date, there is even th~ remotest fair contemplation that some in-
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tercompany transfers from PG&E to
its parent alerts prospective ratepayer claimants that they may have
claims based upon interruption of
service. " 24
The court again noted that
ratepayers, who were not entitled to
have their own official committee,
are not without remedies. "Nothing
stands in the way of the ratepayers
in forming an informal committee,
retaining counsel at their own expense, and seeking to be heard on
matters that pertain to their rights as
ratepayers, if and when those matters come before the Court. " 25 The
court also emphasized that, by its
decision, it was not disallowing
ratepayers' claims. Rather, all
ratepayers who also hold claims may
assert their claims in a timely manner. Moreover, consistent with its
finding that ratepayers do not have
"claims" for rate refunds, the court
ordered public notice "to the effect
that customers of PG&E are not required to file proofs of claim by the
claims deadline in order to ensure
their entitlement to future rate refunds that may be ordered by the
Pubic Utilities Commission."26
Conclusion

Undoubtedly, there are many lessons to be learned from the PG&E
case. Its complexity and unique role
in the history of utility insolvencies
will present many novel and chal-

21

Transcript at 9-10.
In re Jensen, 995 F.2d 925 (9th Cir.
1993).
21
· Transcript at 14.
22
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24 Transcript

at I9.
Transcript at II.
26 Transcript at 23.
25

FROM THE BANKRUPTCY COURTS

lenging legal issues that will require
resolution during the course of the
c;:hapter II case. Early in the case,
the court reminded us that bankruptcy courts, when asked, will judicially review the propriety of U.S.
trustees' appointments of committees under section 1102(a). When
doing so, it will employ an "abuse
of discretion" standard ;o ensure that
they have not acted contrary to the
Bankruptcy Code. The court also
confirmed that the statutory limitations on the power to create committees are real limitations that cannot
be disregarded through the court's
use of its section 105(a) powers. The
court concluded in its decision that
the U.S. trustee, while acting with
good intentions and in the best interest of the ratepayers, did not have
the power to create a Ratepayers

Committee that does not consist of
creditors or equity security holders.
Perhaps the most important lesson
of the court's decision-which may
indicate how it will entertain, or refrain from entertaining, issues yet to
be resolved-is found in its conclusion. The bankruptcy court reminds
the parties that the Bankruptcy Code
and the bankruptcy court were designed to resolve debtor-cre<;litor
problems. In contrast, state agencies
handle su<;h regulatory issues as
rates for electricity. "In its wisdom,
Congress was correct: the estate
should pay for dealing with those
debtor-creditor issues in bankruptcy.
It should not be burdened with matters likely to be resolved elsewhere."27

223

27

PG&E memorandum decision at 10.

